Please Explain (US, World)

The most recent TNR ran two interesting and apparently contradictory articles on US democracy promotion efforts in the middle east and elsewhere. The first, Democratease lambasted the Bushies for their rhetoric/reality gap:

Many longtime players in the democratization industry report a dangerous mismatch between the ambitious--and, at times, self congratulatory--language coming from the White House and the financial and diplomatic investment the Bush administration is making to back up its promises. Beyond Iraq, the professional democracy promoters say, not much has changed.
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[I]f you subtract the Middle East from the budget of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), one of the main supporters of democracy programs conducted by NDI, the International Republican Institute (IRI), and similar organizations, funding has remained flat for the past two years.
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Democracy advocates further contend that, although the Bush administration has funneled more democracy program money toward the Middle East, the way that money is being spent limits its potential impact.
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The big test is coming: How hard will they push friends in Morocco, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar? Are we willing to do more than applaud gradual change?"

The article also notes that in some ways the strong rhetoric hurts democracy promotion campaigns:

Bush is an extremely unpopular figure abroad and especially in the Middle East. As long as it appears that the push for democracy is Bush's personal mission, there is a risk that the effort will provoke a backlash against the United States.
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[D]emocratization industry players are already witnessing some of the negative ramifications of Bush's rhetoric. They say their jobs would be easier if the administration were a bit quieter.

In short the argument is that the administration's in-principle support for democracy spreading is unequivocably good, its strong public rhetoric is a mixed blessing and its funding for programs and behind the scenes democracy is woefully inadequate.

On the other hand Kaplan, in The Effects of American Power, credits developments in "Iraq, Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and Georgia" directly to Bush's policies. After dismissing the "reducto ad Iraqum" argument by downplaying any domino effect, he points out the contributions of specific US diplomatic and democracy-promotion efforts in the Cedar, Orange, Rose and Tulip Revolutions (very pretty collection, isn't it):

Has that invasion changed the world directly? Maybe. Maybe not. What we do know is that it changed the orientation of U.S. foreign policy. And that is changing the world.
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While the United States seldom convinces a government to topple itself, in many situations--particularly moments of crisis--U.S. intervention can tip the scales in favor of democracy.
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[T]he voices in full cry today against "outside interference" belong mostly to the dictators and their allies. As for the democrats, in an interview with the Los Angeles Times, Kyrgyzstan's Tariel Bektemirov neatly summarized their priorities... We beg you to come and interfere," Bektemirov said, "I want the U.S. to interfere. I want the world at large to interfere."

Far be it from me to presume I can properly explain the mess of contradictory evidence but I'll take a stab. The countries with authoritarian governments (of varying degrees) with which Bush seems to have fairly friendly relations and/or very low reform expectations of are Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Uzbekistan, Russia, China, Morocco, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar. The adminstration has strongly pressed for, supported or is properly credited with democratic progress in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, the Palestine Authority, Kyrgystan, Georgia and the Ukraine.

I would argue that in the former group of countries the administration sees short term stability as in its interests while its interests aren't directly affected by change in the latter group. To take one example, democratic change in Lebanon is not threat to US interests despite the strong influence of Hezbollah in the country thanks to an extensive quota system in their parliament which shares seats equally between Muslims and Christians. In short, I think Bush aministration has failed (or is likely to fail) the "big test" of whether or not it will promote democracy against its short term interests.

The question has long gone unanswered - are the neo-cons interested in democracy promotion for its own sake (ie is it a moralistic position that they are taking) or do they prefer to stay out of such "social work" and only promote it where doing so matches up with US strategic goals? If it becomes apparent the latter is the answer then Bush's democracy rhetoric could cause lasting harm to the chances democracy reform worldwide as such goals would be associated with a hypocritical and cynical attempt to expand US power and influence across the globe.

As an aside, if my suspicions are correct it might give me one small glimmer of hope that pressure will be brought to bear on Uzbekistan. Fred Kaplan noted in a well argued if poorly written article that the US has little strategic interest in the country now that Afghanistan provides a base for US operations in Central Asia. The administration's call for an independent investigation and some condemnation on inprisoning political dissidents in this briefing might be consistent with this. Perhaps, perhaps...